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This paper investigates the role of learning - through formal schooling and time spent in the labor 
market - in explaining labor market outcomes of urban workers in Ghana and Tanzania. We 
investigate these issues using a new data set measuring incomes of both formal sector wage 
workers and the self-employed in the informal sector. In both countries we find significant, 
convex returns to education and large earnings differentials between sectors when we pool the 
data and do not control for selection. In Ghana there is a particularly steep age-earnings profile. 
We investigate how far a Harris-Todaro model of market segmentation or a Roy model of 
selection can explain the patterns observed in the data. We find highly significant differences 
across occupations and important effects from selection in both countries. The data is consistent 
with a pattern by which higher ability individuals queue for the high wage formal sector jobs such 
that the age earnings profile is convex for the self-employed in Ghana once we control for 
selection. The returns to education are far higher in the large firm sector than in others and in this 
sector they are linear not convex. In both countries there is clear evidence of convexity in the 
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1 Introduction 
 
How incomes can be increased in Africa is clearly the central issue that has to be addressed in 
understanding how poverty there can be reduced. In this paper we seek to build on three broad 
elements in understanding links between labor market outcomes and incomes. The first, and 
probably most intensively researched, is the role of education. The second is the tradition of dual 
economy models of labor markets which date from early work on surplus labor, summarised and 
clarified in Sen (1966), and the model of rural-urban migration set out by Harris and Todaro 
(1970). The third is a multi-market Roy (1951) model of earnings and selection, applications of 
which have been mainly confined to developed countries, Dahl (2002) . Mortensen (2005) 
provides a review of recent empirical work, mainly for developed economies, seeking to 
understand sources of wage dispersion of a similar kind to which we will observe in our two 
African countries.  
That increases in education is the key to raising incomes and reducing poverty is widely 
believed. Early research reviewed by Psacharopoulos (1994) showed that the significant, robust, 
positive relationship between education and earnings is nearly universal across middle and low 
income countries. More recent work by Schultz (2005) draws on data for nine African countries 
demonstrating that the return to schooling is highly convex, with an extremely modest private 
economic return at the primary level and rising to over 20% at the secondary level. Both 
Psacharopoulos and Schultz interpret their results as an endorsement of universal primary 
education (UPE) as an instrument for poverty alleviation. 
In contrast to the focus on human capital in the modern earnings literature, an earlier 
generation of labor market analysis in developing countries completely ignored the role of skills 
in income determination. This approach, borne out of the African experience, focused instead on 
wage-setting institutions and the earnings differentials between formal and informal or urban and 
rural sectors. Institutionally imposed wage floors in the urban, formal sector were the starting 
point for Harris and Todaro's (1970) influential model and the large number of papers that 
followed in its wake. This formal sector wage floor came to be seen as the fundamental market 
distortion in African economies by many analysts in the 1970s and `80s (Jamal and Weeks 
(1993)) and played a central role in Bates' (1981) path-breaking analysis of African political 
economy. 
The third element on which we propose to draw is work primarily in developed countries 
identifying the importance of both unobservable firm and individual characteristics in 
determining earnings and the processes of selection which may occur as a result of such 
unobservables. Two such variables which have played a major part in the human capital   3
explanation of earning differences are the role of unobserved skill and ability. Some of these 
unobserved skills can, it has been argued, be inferred indirectly from evidence as to how work 
experience affects earning. Following Becker (1964) the increasing, concave relationship between 
age and earnings is interpreted as the diminishing marginal return to general skills acquired 
through work experience. Returns to job tenure reflect job-specific skills that pay a premium 
within a given job and have strong implications for job movement. Taken literally, the age-
earnings profiles which we document below for Ghana suggest that poverty is, on average, a 
transitory phenomenon from an individual perspective. In Ghana the average earnings of a young 
person aged 16 to 20 are about US$24 per month, compared to US$49 for those aged over 30, a 
doubling of income in little more than a decade. How misleading are these cross-section estimates 
of the implied return on work experience?  
In contrast to these partially observed dimensions of skills is the possible role played by 
unobserved ability. High ability types may both we able to acquire more observable human 
capital and earn more. The central focus of this paper is the implications for both the age-earning 
profile and for the interpretation of occupational earnings differentials of the existence of 
different types in a segmented labor market. We use the basic Harris-Todaro framework but allow 
for both skills and unobserved high ability types. We ask how large are the earnings differentials 
between occupational groups with, and without, controls for observable and unobservable skills. 
The skills we consider may also be specific to the occupation in which the workers is employed 
as in the Roy (1951) model. 
To test the model - i.e., to understand the interaction of human capital and wage-setting 
institutions in producing income differences - requires income data on individuals across skill 
classes in both the formal and informal sectors. We know of no existing work using such data for 
Africa, and very little work elsewhere. Rather, current understanding of earnings determination in 
low-income economies is based on a highly unrepresentative sample of the labor force: urban 
wage employees. In his review of the returns to health and education in Africa, Schultz (1999) 
acknowledges this is a problem, noting that his estimates based on wage workers from Ghana are 
informative for approximately 10% of the total labor force. 
This paper presents new survey data specifically designed to address this gap. Like many 
existing data sets, the survey collects a wide range of socioeconomic data from workers in urban 
areas of two African countries: Ghana and Tanzania. The survey is novel in collecting income 
data on the self-employed in the urban informal sector. This data is intended to be comparable to 
wage data for urban employees - a hypothesis which is testable up to a point. In both Ghana and 
Tanzania, the self-employed outnumber wage employees by nearly 2-to-1 in the urban labor   4
force, and constitute the fastest growing segment of the labor force across rural and urban areas. 
Understanding earnings determination in this sector, and how workers sort between sectors is thus 
central to any understanding of labor markets and income distribution in these countries. 
The following section presents our modeling framework and section 3 our data. The 
empirical strategy for addressing selection issues is set out in section 4 and the earnings functions 
allowing for both the endgeneity of education and selection are presented in Section 5. A final 
section concludes. 
 
2  Modeling African Labor Markets 
 
In 1970 John Harris and Michael Todaro published a simple two sector, static model of rural-to-
urban migration. The model set out to explain how throughout the 1960s rural-to-urban migration 
continued unabated despite high levels of open unemployment in the capital city. Furthermore, 
attempts by the Kenyan government to calm political pressure by launching public employment 
initiatives appeared to exacerbate urban unemployment by drawing in new job-seekers from the 
countryside. This phenomenon became known as the Harris-Todaro Paradox. 
Harris and Todaro's (1970) model depicted potential migrants maximizing expected 
earnings by weighing a guaranteed income in the rural sector against a lottery for high wage, 
formal sector jobs in the city. In the years that followed, numerous generalizations of the basic 
Harris-Todaro framework appeared in the literature. Bardhan and Udry (1999) outline a few of 
these variants to the model. The version published by Fields (1975) allowing for simultaneous 
coexistence of open unemployment in the city and an urban informal sector provides the basic 
setup we use below. While we abandon the focus on migration, our analysis builds on, and 
proposes to test, several of the institutional assumptions that define the Harris-Todaro framework. 
The focus in the Harris and Todaro (1970) and Fields (1975) models is on the role of 
unemployment (or informality) in establishing the equilibrium between the formal and the 
informal sector. In the simplest version of these models labour is homogeneous. However in 
taking the model to the data the nature of the differences across labour in terms of their skills is 
clearly a crucial element in establishing how far markets, for given skill levels, are segmented. 
One observable element of these differences is the level of formal education and labour market 
experience.  
The traditional approach to estimating the earnings function has been through seeking 
instruments for education, an approach we intend to follow. We model occupation sorting using a   5
latent variable approach. Here the latent variable is the propensity to sort into a given sector. Only 
the occupation outcome and not the underlying propensity are actually observed: 
[1]  
*
jj j yz     where  (, ,) jf i n   
In the empirical analysis of the next section we identify five sectors, the self-employment, wage 
work in small and large firms, public sector employment and not having a job. Theoretical models 
usually make a distinction between the formal and informal sector assuming the informal sector is 
open access and thus does not need to be distinguished from unemployment. However it is an 
empirical issue as to what constitutes the informal sector. Is there free entry to the informal sector 
and self-employment, if so does this market clear? By allowing these to be sectors separately 
identified in the data we can address that question. 
While both education and age are observable there are key characteristics of both the 
individual and the job which, in the Roy (1951) model, can be observed by the individual but not 
by us. These include the unobserved attributes of the formal and informal sector jobs. There may 
be some forms of attributes which are well rewarded in the informal sector but not the formal, for 
example initiative, which those working in the formal sector may have attributes that pay little or 
nothing in the informal sector. We assume these factors will appear in the residuals of equation 
[1] - j  .  
The outcome variable s y is observed if and only if category s is chosen which happens 
when  
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Given this sorting we will observe earnings in sector s, by definition no earnings accrue 
to the unemployed. If we define   
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The modeling issue that arises is how  and  are assumed to be correlated. Following 
McFadden (1973) if it is assumed that the () j s  are independent and identically Gumbel 
distributed (the so-called IIA hypothesis) then their cumulative and density functions are   6
respectively: ( ) exp( ) Ge
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multinomial logit model with: 
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On the basis of this expression, consistent maximum likelihood estimates of the () j s  can 
be easily obtained. The problem posed by this selection process is to obtain unbiased estimates of 
the parameters of the income equation [4]. In general the disturbance term in this equation may 
not be independent of all the () j s  .  
Define  as follows:   12 ( , ,...., ) M zz z  
    
Following Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgan (2007) we use the fact that given that the 
relation between the M components of  and the M corresponding probabilities is invertible then 
we can obtain consistent estimates of the  s  from either of two regressions: 
[8a]   1, ( ......., ) s sM s y xP P w     
[8b]   () s ss y xw 
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where  s w is a residual that is mean-independent of the regressors. 
The most commonly used approach to dealing with selection in a model of this kind is 
that of Lee (1983) who first proposed a generalisation of the two-step selection bias correction 
method introduced by Heckman (1979).  
Call   the cumulative distribution of  s  .The cumulative   defined by the 
following transform:         where is the standard normal cumulative, has 
a standard normal distribution. Lee’s model can be written as implying that: 
[9]   (|, ) .(| )
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and yields an estimating equation of the form: 
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It is this equation which we will use in reporting the results which allow for selection by Lee’s 
method. 
As discussed by Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgan (2007) the Lee approach makes 
restrictive assumptions as to how the errors across the selection and outcome equations are 
related. Lee’s assumptions imply that the covariance of the errors in the earnings equation for 
sector s and the errors in the occupational sectors are all of the same sign (see Schmertmann   7
(1994)). For example, let us hypothesise that ability A makes it less likely that the individual will 
be unemployed and, conditional on having a job in the formal sector, that A will boost their 
earnings. This sets up a negative correlation between the unobservable earnings in the formal 
sector and the unobservable propensity to have no job. Lee’s assumptions for addressing the 
selection issue imply that all the correlations with the other sectors be negative too. Indeed in the 
form of the model set out in equation [10] they are all assumed to be equal as there is only one 
parameter  s  . 
This is clearly restrictive and in this paper we compare the Lee method with that 
proposed by Dubin and McFadden (1984) which allows these correlations to differ. As we will 
show this relaxation of the Lee’s assumption is important for our empirical results. 
The basis for correcting sample selection proposed by Dubin and McFadden (1984) is an 
equation of the form: 
[11]   1
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where  j r is the correlation coefficient between  s u and  j  . Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgan 
(2007, p. 178) summarise how this leads to an equation which can be estimated. 
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  . We do not. Equation 
[12] will be used in the sample correction equations to relax the Lee assumptions.  
 The   vector in [12] contains the observable elements of human capital. The two of 
which we propose to focus are Education and Age. There has been a very large literature 
concerned with addressing the problem posed by the endogeneity of education.  
If there is sorting along the lines hypothesised by a Roy model then in principle all the 
results of the OLS earnings function will be biased. In particular any finding of sectoral 
differences in earnings between the formal and informal sector need not imply that a Harris-
Todaro model is relevant for understanding these differences, they may arise from a Roy sorting 
model. If there is extensive “waiting” and those who wait longest are those who have high ability 
then such a model sets up a selection process by which the cross-section age-earning profile is 
simply an artifact of the queuing for formal sector jobs.  
In the original context for the Harris-Todaro model the formal sector was the public 
sector where both wages and employment were set exogenously. We have shown in another paper   8
based on this data, Sandefur, Serneels and Teal (2006), that size is an important correlate of 
earnings among both the wage and the self-employed. The data suggest not a clear line between 
formality and informality but a spectrum from low formality for the own self-employed and wage 
employees in small firms to increasing levels of formality as enterprise size rises with the highest 
earnings being in the public sector. We set up the data so this potential dimension of formality 
can be investigated. 
 
3 The  Data 
 
Our data is taken from a longitudinal labor market survey conducted by the Centre for the Study 
of African Economies (CSAE) at Oxford University, under the direction of the authors and in 
collaboration with the Ghana Statistical Office (GSO) and the Tanzania National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS). We refer to the data set as the Ghana and Tanzania Urban Panel Survey (UPS). 
The survey collects information on incomes, education and labor market experience, household 
characteristics and various other modules for labor force participants (ages 15 to 60) in urban 
areas. For Ghana these areas span the four largest urban centers in the country: Accra (and 
neighboring Tema), Kumasi, Takoradi and Cape Coast. In Tanzania, the sample covers several of 
the largest urban areas including Arusha, Dar es Salaam, Iringa, Morogoro, Mwanza, and Tanga. 
The samples were based on a stratified random sample of urban households from the 
2000 census in Ghana and the 2000 Household Budget Survey (HBS) in Tanzania.
1 While the 
initial sample was household based, interviews were conducted on an individual basis, and the 
unit of analysis in most of what follows will be at the individual level. A total of 830 and 543 
individuals were interviewed in the first round of the survey in Ghana and Tanzania respectively, 
which was conducted between October 2003 and June 2004. 
A features of the UPS data which is important for answering the questions posed in this 
paper is that it provides comparable information, including income data, on both wage employees 
and the self employed. All labor force participants in the selected households were to be 
interviewed. Thus the sample of workers spans the formal and informal sectors, public and 
private employees, the self-employed, unemployed and so on. 
                                                    
1 For the narrow group of readers familiar with the CSAE's survey work in Ghana, we should note that the 
analysis in this paper does not incorporate data from the Ghana Manufacturing Enterprise Survey (GMES). 
The UPS and the GMES are conducted in parallel with a common survey instrument. However, we restrict 
ourselves in this paper to the population based sample of the UPS, excluding the firm-based sample of 
manufacturing employees interviewed through the GMES.   9
Collecting income data on the self-employed in low-income countries is a controversial 
endeavor. Field guides for the World Bank's Living Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS), 
which serve as the international standard for household surveys in development economics, 
recommend survey managers not collect this information. The stated rationale is that self-
employed business people in the informal sector rarely keep written accounts and their self-
reported income data may be too noisy to be of use. For household based enterprizes, the 
distinction between business and personal expenditures may be completely alien to respondents. 
We acknowledge the validity of these concerns. 
However, because the non-agricultural self-employed constitute a majority of the urban 
working population in both Ghana and Tanzania, we feel the incomes in this sector are too 
important to ignore. Our income measure for the self-employed is based on self-reported profits. 
Profits are net of routine operating expenses and gross of fixed capital expenditure, if any. The 
concepts of ``revenue'', ``business costs'', and ``profits'' are explained to respondents by 
enumerators with experience in conducting firm and household surveys. As the surveys are 
entered directly onto handheld computers, a simple mechanical check forces enumerators to go 
over the numbers again if revenue, cost and profit figures are inconsistent. While enumerators 
have reported few conceptual difficulties with this portion of the questionnaire, we feel a better 
test of the validity of self-reported income data is our ability to explain its variation with personal, 
household and business characteristics, as we attempt to do below. 
During the course of July-August 2005 the initial UPS sample was resurveyed and 
questions were asked which enabled us to link their activities and earnings in 2005 with the same 
variables in 2003/04, creating a panel of individual workers. The data that will be used in this 
paper is for both the 2004 and 2005 rounds of the survey.  
Table 1 sets out how large are the differences in earnings across the formal and informal 
sectors within these economies and how closely these are related to education levels. In both 
Ghana and Tanzania median earnings are higher in self-employment than in the small firm sector 
(a small firm is one employing less than 10 workers) and the public sector pays substantially 
more than even the large firm sector. Earning differentials across what might be termed the 
informal (ie small firm) sector and the formal (public sector workers) appear large in both 
countries, a differential of nearly 3 times. Table 1 also shows that the public sector worker has a 
substantially higher level of education than the other sectors, particularly in Tanzania where the 
median levels for all other sectors is 7 years of education while for the public sector it is 12. How 
large are these differences across occupation once we control for observable human capital in the 
form of education and age (as our proxy for work experience) and the endogeneity of education?   10
In Table 2 we report summary statistics of the variables we are going to use as instruments for 
education. These are the distances to the nearest primary and secondary schools when the 
individual being interviewed were at school and the education and occupations of their parents. 
We use these instruments to predict education in the first two columns of Table 3. We 
then ask how much of the occupational differences we observed remain after we control for 
human capital and allow for the endogeneity of education by means of the residuals from the 
education equation (these residuals are the control variable reported in Table 3.) The results with 
the control variable are reported for Ghana in Column (4) and for Tanzania in Column (6). The 
results show that while the differential is reduced it remains substantial. In Ghana the differential 
between being in the public sector and working in a small firm is 1.8 times, in Tanzania the 
differential 2.4 times. In both Ghana and Tanzania the data appear to show a clear pattern by 
which those in small firms earn the least and those in the public sector the most. 
While Table 3 controls for the endogeneity of education it does not allow for Roy 
selection. To address that issue our empirical strategy has two steps. First, we estimate the 
determinants of the job search decision, distinguishing between formal employment (in the public 
or private sector), informal employment (either self-employed or in a small or micro enterprize) 
and unemployment. We model occupational choice using a multinomial logit with plausible 
determinants of expected earnings and the reservation wage as independent variables. Second, we 
estimate the determinants of earnings in the cross section. We report the results of using both the 
Lee (1983) and Dubin and McFadden (1984) correction terms for selection. 
 
4  The Empirical Strategy for Selection 
 
What determines occupational choices? In the model presented in section 2 occupation choices 
depend on the probability of acquiring a good job and the relative earnings in each sector, 
including the reservation wage in unemployment. Following a long tradition in estimating labor 
supply decisions, we use estimate occupational choices using variables thought to predict 
earnings in each occupation. In theory, these variables might differ for each sector (public sector 
employment, formal sector private employment, etc.). In practice, we divide the explanatory 
variables into just two categories. The first category is a vector of personal characteristics thought 
to predict earnings conditional on employment in any sector, including gender, age and education. 
The second category is a vector of personal and family characteristics that will arguably 
determine the reservation wage, including marital status, number of children, status as household   11
head, mother and father's education level, and occupation codes for the respondent's mother and 
father. 
We present the results of this multinomial logit for education and age in Table 4 (the 
actual equation is reported in the Appendix). For both  countries the probability of working in the 
public sector increase with the level of education but this effect is much greater in Tanzania than 
in Ghana. In Ghana the probability of working in a large firm also increases with education but 
this is not true in Tanzania. In both countries the probability fo working as either self-employed 
or in a small firm decreases with education. However self-employment dominates all forms of 
employment below the level of university. 
By far the most important aspect of age in Ghana is the rise in the probability of being in 
self-employment and the fall in the probability of not having a job. For Tanzania it is the rise with 
age in the probability of being in the public sector and the fall in the probability of being in the 
small firm sector. Clearly both these patterns are consistent with a pattern of “waiting” by which 
there is a preference for a public or large firm job and as the probability of obtaining one declines 
the worker switches to the informal sector. If so then selection into the sector will be an important 
determinant of earnings there. 
 
5  The Empirical Strategy for Earnings 
 
In this section we set out earnings functions for Ghana and Tanzania for both wage and self-
employment. We begin in Table 5 by asking how the earnings function differs across occupation 
with no controls either for the endogeneity of education or for occupational selection. It is clear 
that there are radical changes from the pooled regression in both the age earnings profile and the 
returns to education. In Ghana the concave age earnings profile is confined to the private sector 
while the convex education earnings function is confined to the self-employed and those working 
in small firms. In Tanzania the convex earnings function is confined to the self-employed and 
those in large firms. In large firms the return on age is convex, not concave as in the pooled 
regression. Clearly the results we reported in Table 3 are misleading as to how education impacts 
on earnings within sectors.  
The results in Table 5 are consistent with the returns to human capital being sector 
specific but they do not control for either the endogeneity of education nor the possibility of Roy 
occupational sorting. That we do next in Tables 6 for Ghana and in Table 7 for Tanzania. In both 
Tables we report results across the four occupational sectors we have identified and for each   12
sector we report the results of using the controls for selection due to Lee (1883) and Durbin and 
McFadden (1984) (DMF).  
The results in Table 6 for Ghana suggest that Roy selection is a very important aspect of 
the determinants of income in the economy. For the self-employed the concave age earnings 
profile shown in Table 5 disappears with the controls for selection in Table 6. These results hold 
whether we model selection by the Lee term as in Table 6 Column (1) or those due to DMF 
Column (2). In fact selection matters in a way that is informative as to the nature of choices 
available in the economy. Both Lee and DMF imply a negative correlation between the 
unobservables that induced movement into the sector and earnings when engaged there. How if 
self-employment is the preferred sector can this correlation be negative? Clearly it is possible if 
self-employment becomes the preferred sector over time as there is a period of waiting for a high 
paid job in the formal sector defined here as either the large firm or public sector. Further the 
DMF selection terms by being more general than those of LEE identify a positive correlation 
between earnings in self-employment and the unobservables determining the choice of work in 
the public sector. The reason that the public sector is not “chosen” is that employment there is 
rationed and, the results imply, these abilities are productive in the self-employment sector.  
Not only selection but the endogeneity of education matter in self-employment in Ghana. 
The returns to education remain convex but the degree of convexity becomes more pronounced 
relative to the results with no controls as reported in Table 5. The implications of such convexity 
is that the returns to education for those with low levels is lower than that to those with more 
education. However in Table 6 we see how misleading were the results of the pooled regressions 
in Table 3. Using the DMF selection correction terms we see that the returns to education in the 
large firm sector are linear and large. The average return to education there is 34 per cent (Table 
6, Column (6) which compares with 4.7 per cent for the self-employed (column (2) and 6 per cent 
for those in small firms (Column (4). There ae no significant returns to human capital in the 
public sector. 
The results in Table 7 for Tanzania differ in several respects to those of Ghana. The 
pooled regression for Tanzania reported in Table 3 did not identify a concave age earnings 
function while the disaggregation reported in Table 5 showed a significant convex one for large 
firms. Selection does not alter this result. Selection is however a significant factor in assessing the 
returns to education in Tanzania, convexity is confined to the self-employed sector. The evidence 
here too is consistent with “waiting” for formal sector jobs being an important aspect of the 
selection process. In Table 7 Column (2) we see that here is a highly significant DMF seelction 
term on the no job occupational outcome which implies a positive correlation between the   13
unobservables in self-employment earnings and the outcome for that sector.  This is consistent 
with those with higher reservation wages, and more market ability, waiting longer before they 
enter the self-employed sector. Returns to education in the public sector are actually negative, 
consistent with both compressed differentials within that sector and high rents which induce 




Where then are the returns to education high? In Ghana we find that controls for the endogeneity 
of education and for selection imply that the convexity of the returns to education are confined to 
the self-employed and small firm sector, although within these sectors the degree of convexity 
increases with the controls. For the large firm sector the returns to education are very large (on 
average in excess of 30 per cent) and appear to be linear. These conclusions depend on using the 
Durbin and McFadden (1984) controls. Within the public sector we find no return to education, a 
result that does not depend on how we adjust for selection. Focusing on the results using the DMF 
controls we see for Ghana that the concave age earning profile only holds in the small firm sector. 
In fact the profile is convex in the other sectors.  
For Tanzania we find that the convex return to education is confined to the self-
employed. Our sample sizes for small and large firms are small but we find for large firms a 
strongly concave return to education, a result which does not depend on how selection is modeled 
but does depend on selection. Also, as in Ghana, we find no return to education in the public 
sector. We noted that the concave age earning profile in Tanzania was not nearly as sizable or 
well identified as that in Ghana. Once we control for selection we find it is negative and convex 
for the large firm and public sectors. Selection appears a very important aspects of these labour 
markets and to operate in a way that is consistent with the kind of market segmentation 
hypothesized by Harris and Todaro. High rent sector motivate search which influences the time 
individuals enter specific sectors rendering both the age earnings profile and returns to education 
on pooled regressions very misleading.  
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Mean Median  Median Mean Median  Median 
Self  10.92 45  9  5.43 39  7 
Employment  (754)   (618)  
   
Small  10.67 34  9  5.12 33  7 
Firm  (157)   (72)  
   
Large   11.47 72  11 5.80 57  7 
Firm  (123)   (69)  
   
Public  11.77 98  14 6.20 98  12 
(97)   (151)  
   
Not   NA NA  10 NA NA  7 
Employed  (509)     (61) 
   
Total  11.02 45  10 5.57 47  7 
(1131) (1131) (1640) (910) (910) (971) 
Figures in ( ) are the number of observations. 
 
Table 2 Determinants of Education in Ghana and Tanzania: 2004-2005 
























Median  2 4.5 3 12 0  0 
Mean  1.92 5.58 5.17 8.50 0.06 0.37 
N = 1640 
Tanzania 
Median  2 4.5 3  6  0  0 
Mean  2.42 5.41 3.96 6.73 0.08 0.29 
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Table 3 Determinants of Education and Pooled Earnings in Ghana and Tanzania 
   Ghana  Tanzania  Ghana  Tanzania 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
Education  Ln (Real Earnings in 1995 prices) 
                    
Male  2.22***  1.03*** 0.32*** 0.28*** 0.32*** 0.27*** 
(0.20)  (0.20) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Age 0.12  0.22***  0.09***  0.09***  0.04  0.03 
(0.09)  (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Age
2 -0.09  -0.26***  -0.11***  -0.11***  -0.05  -0.03 
(0.12)  (0.10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Kdistprim -0.22***  -0.18*** 
(0.07) (0.04) 
Kdistsec -0.06*  0.12*** 
(0.03) (0.02) 
Momeduc 0.07***  0.11*** 
(0.02) (0.04) 
Dadeduc 0.31***  0.11*** 
(0.02) (0.03) 
Momformal 1.14***  1.22*** 
(0.41) (0.36) 
Dadformal 0.15  0.94*** 
(0.22) (0.23) 
Lhours  0.32*** 0.33*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) 
Education -0.05***  -0.03  -0.01  0.06 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
Education
2  0.48*** 0.47*** 0.63*** 0.58*** 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.21) (0.21) 
Small firm  -0.20***  -0.20***  -0.38  -0.37 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.23) (0.23) 
Large firm  0.37***  0.36***  0.16**  0.15** 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Public  Sector  0.58*** 0.58*** 0.50*** 0.48*** 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) 
Control for 
Education -0.03**  -0.07*** 
(0.01) (0.03) 
Constant 545.65  317.92  102.36  88.73  -254.16*  -260.11* 
(405.31) (391.29) (92.87) (93.15) (141.94)  (141.29) 
Observations 1131  910  1131  1131  910  910 
R-squared  0.340  0.239 0.234 0.237 0.206 0.212 
Marginal ROR 
(evaluated at mean)  0.035 0.054 0.100 0.161 
Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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employment  Small Firm  Large Firm  Public Sector  No 
employment
None  0.62  0.09  0.01  0.00  0.27 
Junior 
Secondary  0.52  0.09  0.05  0.02  0.32 
Senior 
Secondary  0.42  0.08  0.08  0.06  0.36 
University  0.29  0.06  0.11  0.17  0.37 
 
Tanzania Education 
None  0.79  0.05  0.05  0.01  0.10 
Junior 
Secondary  0.72  0.07  0.05  0.10  0.05 
Senior 
Secondary  0.62  0.06  0.05  0.24  0.04 
University  0.41  0.03  0.03  0.50  0.03 
 
Ghana Age 
Age 20  0.24  0.09  0.06  0.01  0.60 
Age 30  0.54  0.10  0.05  0.01  0.30 
Age 40  0.66  0.07  0.04  0.01  .21 
Age 50  0.61  0.05 0.04 0.03 0.27 
Age 60  0.31  0.02  0.03  0.13  0.51 
 
Tanzania Age 
Age 20  0.66  0.27  0.01  0.01  0.04 
Age 30  0.77  0.09  0.05  0.05  0.05 
Age 40  0.72  0.04  0.07  0.11  0.05 
Age 50  0.64  0.04  0.05  0.21  0.05 
Age 60  0.52  0.07  0.02  0.34  0.05 
 
Notes; These probabilities are calculated from the multinomial logit reported in the Appendix. All 
other regressors are held at their mean values.      19
 
Table 5 Earnings Function for Ghana and Tanzania: by Occupation and No controls 
Dependent Variable Ln (Real Earnings in 1995 prices) 





















Lhours  0.34***  0.45*  0.13  0.01  0.42***  2.362 0.189 0.107 
(0.11) (0.26) (0.25) (0.42)  (0.122)  (1.504)  (0.259)  (0.465) 
Male  0.39*** 0.31***  0.04  0.07  0.36*** 1.27***  0.132  -0.103 
(0.07) (0.11) (0.14) (0.13)  (0.075)  (0.413)  (0.112)  (0.195) 
Age  0.08*** 0.24*** 0.13***  0.05  0.010  0.208  -0.13*** -0.016 
(0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.029)  (0.129)  (0.035)  (0.079) 
Age
2  -0.09***  -0.33***  -0.15** -0.05  -0.005 -0.308  0.16*** 0.025 
(0.03) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.035)  (0.200)  (0.045)  (0.087) 
Education  -0.05** -0.05*  0.10  0.02  0.006  -0.354  -0.010  0.118 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.12)  (0.033)  (0.421)  (0.085)  (0.093) 
Education
2  0.37**  0.62*** -0.05  0.18  0.410* 3.129 0.807* 0.016 
(0.17) (0.20) (0.40) (0.45)  (0.212)  (2.736)  (0.481)  (0.496) 
Trend  -0.03 -0.17 0.03  0.01 0.066 0.358  0.221**  0.195 
(0.06) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13)  (0.070)  (0.504)  (0.103)  (0.191) 
Constant  59.01  346.34  -61.13  -14.79  -128.751 -725.606 -436.4** -385.233 
(122.21) (219.36) (224.73) (252.13)  (140.0)  (1,014)  (207.6)  (382.6) 
Observations  754  157  123 97 618 72  69 151 
R-squared  0.094 0.375 0.366 0.196 0.174 0.295 0.621 0.268 
Rates of Return (ROR) 
 Average (a)  -0.015 0.001 0.074 0.037 0.036 -0.236 0.043 0.091 
Marginal (a)  0.018 0.056 0.087 0.069 0.063 0.084 0.102 0.122 
Median levels 
of Education  9 9  11  14  7 7 7  12 
(a) The average and marginal rates of return (ROR) are evaluated at the median levels of education for each 
occupation. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     20
Table 6 Earnings Functions for Ghana  
Dependent Variable Ln (Real Earnings in 1995 prices) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Self-Employment  Small firm  Large firm  Public Sector 
LEE DMF LEE DMF LEE DMF LEE DMF 
Lhours 0.35***  0.36***  0.46*  0.45*  0.12  0.00  -0.01  0.01 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.25) (0.26) (0.25) (0.28) (0.43) (0.42) 
Male 0.47***  0.43***  0.18  0.14  -0.05  0.21  0.13  0.33 
(0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.18) (0.25) (0.29) (0.16) (0.22) 
Age  -0.07 -0.11**  0.22***  0.20* 0.11** -0.22  0.07*  -0.04 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.05) (0.15) (0.04) (0.18) 
Age
2  0.08 0.14**  -0.28***  -0.26*  -0.13* 0.30  -0.08  0.05 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.07) (0.19) (0.06) (0.24) 
Education -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.06  0.35**  -0.07 0.15 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.16) (0.17) (0.25) 
Education
2  0.76*** 1.02*** 0.71*** 0.59**  0.00  -0.18  0.21  -0.18 
(0.21) (0.25) (0.21) (0.29) (0.41) (0.67) (0.50) (0.62) 
Control -0.04**  -0.05***  -0.07*  -0.08*  0.02  -0.04  0.07*  0.03 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
Dmf_self 0.44**  0.96 0.51 -1.21 
(0.22) (1.38) (1.52) (1.88) 
Dmf_small 0.03  0.03  1.07  0.89 
(0.42) (0.14) (1.00) (2.06) 
Dmf_big 0.15  0.36  -0.32  1.13 
(0.62) (1.02) (0.22) (1.32) 
Dmf_pub 1.30**  0.38  3.71**  -0.03 
(0.60) (1.34) (1.48) (0.23) 
Dmf_none 1.10** 1.16 4.63** 0.83 
(0.55) (1.41) (1.88) (1.07) 
Lee -0.96***  -0.16  -0.20  -0.21 
(0.26) (0.30) (0.33) (0.36) 
Constant 149.07  227.93*  303.45  339.82  -46.15  252.08  -7.33  7.02 
(122.84) (132.50) (223.47) (232.63) (225.39) (239.64) (234.99) (285.85) 
Obs  754 754 157 157 123 123  97  97 
R-squared  0.116 0.119 0.398 0.404 0.369 0.429 0.223 0.254 
Rates of Return (ROR) 
Average  0.032 0.047 0.049 0.060 0.065  0.34 -0.045 0.12 
Marginal   0.018 0.056 0.087 0.069 0.063 0.084 0.102 0.122 
Education  9 9 9 9  11  11  14  14 
Test of 










***   
0.09
(0.15)
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7 Earnings Function for Tanzania  
Dependent Variable Ln (Real Earnings in 1995 prices) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) 
Self-Employment  Small firm  Large firm  Public Sector 
    LEE DMF LEE DMF LEE  DMF LEE DMF 
Lhours  0.43***  0.37***  2.43 1.88 0.12  0.11 -0.20 -0.31 
(0.12) (0.12) (1.49) (1.18) (0.23)  (0.23) (0.50)  (0.49) 
Male  0.33*** 0.19  0.58  0.30 0.48***  0.30  0.54**  -0.03 
(0.08) (0.13) (0.39) (0.93) (0.17)  (0.19) (0.24)  (0.24) 
Age -0.01  0.03  0.42  0.50  -0.12**  -0.15**  -0.12  -0.27* 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.31) (0.33) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.10)  (0.14) 
Age
2  0.02 -0.02 -0.53 -0.56  0.14**  0.16** 0.07  0.24* 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.39) (0.38) (0.06)  (0.07) (0.09)  (0.14) 
Education  0.05  0.01  -0.06 -0.20 0.21* 0.20* -0.13 -0.45* 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.39) (0.46) (0.11)  (0.11) (0.17)  (0.27) 
Education
2  0.44**  0.40*  3.37 4.92 0.32 -0.15  -0.08 0.31 
(0.22) (0.23) (3.07) (3.78) (0.50)  (0.46) (0.63)  (0.93) 
Control  -0.05*  -0.02 -0.33 -0.20  -0.15***  -0.11***  -0.01 0.15* 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.24) (0.26) (0.04)  (0.04) (0.06)  (0.09) 
Dmf_self -0.04  3.07 -0.79 1.46 
(0.40) (5.16)  (1.18) (0.99) 
Dmf_small -0.59  0.24  -0.48  1.72 
(0.59) (0.41)  (0.68) (1.69) 
Dmf_big 0.36  4.56  -0.07  -5.75** 
(0.71) (4.95)  (0.17) (2.29) 
Dmf_pub 0.22  8.46  -2.11***  1.15** 
(0.85) (7.21)  (0.68) (0.52) 
Dmf_none  2.13***  7.78 1.18 3.59 
(0.77) (5.73)  (1.11) (2.18) 
Lee -0.28  -2.03  0.64**  -1.79** 
(0.27) (1.32) (0.26)  (0.88) 
Constant  -143.27  -428.8**  -1,169  -1,258  -500.1** -795.0*** -757.3* -1,124.5** 
(140.06)  (201.56) (1,040)  (1,092) (204.50) (207.32)  (389)  (437.76) 
Obs  618  618 72  72  69  69 151 151 
R-squared  0.179 0.196 0.341 0.375 0.692  0.726 0.343 0.404 
Rates of Return (ROR) 
Average  0.085 0.034 0.174 0.144 0.235  0.187 -0.138 -0.408 
Marginal   0.117 0.062 0.409 0.488 0.257  0.177 -0.147 -0.371 
Education  7 7 7 7 7  7 12  12 
Test of 









***   
-0.38
(0.21)* 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Multinomial Logit for Ghana 
 
. mlogit occup $z_occup $g_cities if country=="Ghana", base(5) 
 
 
Multinomial logistic regression                   Number of obs   =       1640 
                                                  LR chi2(72)     =     734.92 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1775.2231                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1715 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       occup |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
self         | 
        male |  -.2231523   .1455154    -1.53   0.125    -.5083574    .0620527 
         age |   .3898483   .0502781     7.75   0.000      .291305    .4883915 
       agesq |  -.4743283   .0685858    -6.92   0.000    -.6087539   -.3399026 
        educ |   .0143789   .0506899     0.28   0.777    -.0849715    .1137292 
      educsq |  -.5732546   .3288607    -1.74   0.081     -1.21781    .0713005 
   kdistprim |  -.0479074   .0443084    -1.08   0.280    -.1347502    .0389354 
    kdistsec |  -.0586812   .0172041    -3.41   0.001    -.0924007   -.0249617 
     momeduc |   .0003828   .0162105     0.02   0.981    -.0313891    .0321548 
     dadeduc |  -.0273207   .0163047    -1.68   0.094    -.0592774     .004636 
   momformal |  -.2844869   .2912727    -0.98   0.329    -.8553709     .286397 
   dadformal |   .1531491   .1456307     1.05   0.293    -.1322819    .4385801 
     married |   .5243778   .1587083     3.30   0.001     .2133153    .8354404 
    children |  -.0274878   .0484397    -0.57   0.570    -.1224278    .0674522 
      hhhead |   .4518191   .1582449     2.86   0.004     .1416648    .7619733 
       trend |   .2019249   .1284651     1.57   0.116     -.049862    .4537118 
      cityG2 |  -.4884512   .3470838    -1.41   0.159    -1.168723    .1918205 
      cityG3 |   .0827995    .208191     0.40   0.691    -.3252474    .4908464 
      cityG4 |    .406809   .2099275     1.94   0.053    -.0046413    .8182592 
       _cons |  -411.0172   257.4919    -1.60   0.110    -915.6921    93.65763 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
small        | 
        male |   .0298103   .2046155     0.15   0.884    -.3712286    .4308493 
         age |   .2870855   .0852462     3.37   0.001      .120006     .454165 
       agesq |  -.4043467   .1274457    -3.17   0.002    -.6541356   -.1545578 
        educ |   .0290035    .080715     0.36   0.719    -.1291949    .1872019 
      educsq |  -.5392167    .505641    -1.07   0.286    -1.530255    .4518214 
   kdistprim |   .0620833   .0582399     1.07   0.286    -.0520648    .1762314 
    kdistsec |  -.0700276    .027779    -2.52   0.012    -.1244734   -.0155818 
     momeduc |  -.0049403   .0231858    -0.21   0.831    -.0503836     .040503 
     dadeduc |  -.0188061   .0241072    -0.78   0.435    -.0660554    .0284433 
   momformal |    .063231   .4022858     0.16   0.875    -.7252347    .8516967 
   dadformal |  -.0844924    .213005    -0.40   0.692    -.5019746    .3329898 
     married |   .1644421   .2522728     0.65   0.515    -.3300035    .6588876 
    children |  -.3911359   .1029677    -3.80   0.000    -.5929488    -.189323 
      hhhead |   .7756996   .2285116     3.39   0.001      .327825    1.223574 
       trend |   .1072778   .1911539     0.56   0.575     -.267377    .4819326 
      cityG2 |  -.3444049   .5758611    -0.60   0.550    -1.473072    .7842621 
      cityG3 |   .2917272   .3281626     0.89   0.374    -.3514597     .934914 
      cityG4 |   .5023237   .3350372     1.50   0.134     -.154337    1.158985 
       _cons |  -220.3292   383.0921    -0.58   0.565     -971.176    530.5175 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
big          | 
        male |   1.246777   .2684864     4.64   0.000     .7205528       1.773 
         age |   .2013411   .0917237     2.20   0.028     .0215659    .3811162 
       agesq |  -.2642877   .1251682    -2.11   0.035     -.509613   -.0189625 
        educ |   .1619721   .1221033     1.33   0.185    -.0773458    .4012901 
      educsq |  -.3175635    .580052    -0.55   0.584    -1.454445    .8193176 
   kdistprim |  -.0590876   .0780058    -0.76   0.449    -.2119762    .0938009 
    kdistsec |  -.0169393   .0309789    -0.55   0.585    -.0776569    .0437782 
     momeduc |   .0215358   .0265817     0.81   0.418    -.0305634     .073635 
     dadeduc |  -.0013565   .0279254    -0.05   0.961    -.0560893    .0533762 
   momformal |    .650188   .3862434     1.68   0.092    -.1068351    1.407211 
   dadformal |   -.193796   .2437946    -0.79   0.427    -.6716247    .2840327 
     married |   .6535238   .2828014     2.31   0.021     .0992431    1.207804 
    children |  -.1196238    .091568    -1.31   0.191    -.2990939    .0598462 
      hhhead |   1.252162   .2809087     4.46   0.000     .7015911    1.802733 
       trend |   .1466963   .2166152     0.68   0.498    -.2778618    .5712543   23
      cityG2 |  -1.160681    .808412    -1.44   0.151     -2.74514     .423777 
      cityG3 |   .3137569    .348639     0.90   0.368     -.369563    .9970768 
      cityG4 |   .4022089   .3612849     1.11   0.266    -.3058966    1.110314 
       _cons |  -301.8194   434.1446    -0.70   0.487    -1152.727    549.0885 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
public       | 
        male |   .3231275   .2893333     1.12   0.264    -.2439553    .8902103 
         age |  -.0056742   .1035075    -0.05   0.956    -.2085453    .1971968 
       agesq |   .0811773   .1357383     0.60   0.550    -.1848649    .3472195 
        educ |   .6576127   .3145067     2.09   0.037     .0411909    1.274034 
      educsq |  -1.254633   1.194184    -1.05   0.293     -3.59519    1.085924 
   kdistprim |  -.0152569   .0989022    -0.15   0.877    -.2091016    .1785878 
    kdistsec |  -.1644958   .0536393    -3.07   0.002    -.2696268   -.0593647 
     momeduc |  -.0020955   .0305053    -0.07   0.945    -.0618847    .0576938 
     dadeduc |  -.0271856   .0345529    -0.79   0.431     -.094908    .0405369 
   momformal |   .4730179   .4411918     1.07   0.284    -.3917022    1.337738 
   dadformal |   .4336503   .2843857     1.52   0.127    -.1237354    .9910359 
     married |   .8046039   .3137128     2.56   0.010      .189738     1.41947 
    children |  -.1538673   .1037152    -1.48   0.138    -.3571453    .0494107 
      hhhead |   1.392831   .3348588     4.16   0.000     .7365203    2.049142 
       trend |  -.1548345   .2585342    -0.60   0.549    -.6615522    .3518833 
      cityG2 |   .7146756   .5281249     1.35   0.176    -.3204302    1.749781 
      cityG3 |   .1453116   .4067444     0.36   0.721    -.6518928     .942516 
      cityG4 |  -.1445446   .4716051    -0.31   0.759    -1.068874    .7797844 
       _cons |   301.8829   518.1798     0.58   0.560    -713.7309    1317.497 
 
 
Appendix Multinomial Logit for Tanzania 
 
 




Multinomial logistic regression                   Number of obs   =        971 
                                                  LR chi2(80)     =     340.83 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -928.42373                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1551 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       occup |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
self         | 
        male |   .2468858   .3678285     0.67   0.502    -.4740449    .9678164 
         age |   .0039053   .1209237     0.03   0.974    -.2331008    .2409114 
       agesq |  -.0184457   .1437428    -0.13   0.898    -.3001764     .263285 
        educ |   .0937882    .141824     0.66   0.508    -.1841818    .3717582 
      educsq |   -.337557   .9618648    -0.35   0.726    -2.222777    1.547663 
   kdistprim |   .0885963   .0747763     1.18   0.236    -.0579626    .2351553 
    kdistsec |   .0059949   .0337275     0.18   0.859    -.0601097    .0720995 
     momeduc |   .0875089    .056269     1.56   0.120    -.0227763    .1977942 
     dadeduc |   .0303874    .043235     0.70   0.482    -.0543516    .1151264 
   momformal |  -.2007229   .6990147    -0.29   0.774    -1.570767    1.169321 
   dadformal |    .152262   .3556808     0.43   0.669    -.5448595    .8493835 
     married |   .4064242   .3334476     1.22   0.223     -.247121    1.059969 
    children |   -.044904   .0746582    -0.60   0.548    -.1912315    .1014234 
      hhhead |   .4235197    .363808     1.16   0.244     -.289531     1.13657 
       trend |   -.591782   .2810034    -2.11   0.035    -1.142539   -.0410254 
      cityT2 |  -.6601001   .4762334    -1.39   0.166      -1.5935    .2733001 
      cityT3 |   .5322591   .6855646     0.78   0.438    -.8114229    1.875941 
      cityT4 |  -1.028887   .5805314    -1.77   0.076    -2.166708    .1089337 
      cityT5 |  -.0943441   .6060365    -0.16   0.876    -1.282154    1.093465 
      cityT6 |   .1469401   .6444253     0.23   0.820     -1.11611     1.40999 
       _cons |   1187.421   563.0607     2.11   0.035     83.84202    2290.999 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
small        | 
        male |    .568852   .4646153     1.22   0.221    -.3417773    1.479481 
         age |   -.289319   .1534352    -1.89   0.059    -.5900466    .0114085 
       agesq |    .312551   .1849663     1.69   0.091    -.0499763    .6750784 
        educ |    .197128   .2176478     0.91   0.365    -.2294539    .6237099   24
      educsq |  -.8850147   1.382572    -0.64   0.522    -3.594806    1.824776 
   kdistprim |  -.0422209   .1098428    -0.38   0.701    -.2575089    .1730671 
    kdistsec |   -.044297   .0468402    -0.95   0.344     -.136102     .047508 
     momeduc |    .114716   .0690537     1.66   0.097    -.0206268    .2500587 
     dadeduc |   .0220869   .0558898     0.40   0.693    -.0874552    .1316289 
   momformal |   .1199272   .8603306     0.14   0.889     -1.56629    1.806144 
   dadformal |  -.5212942   .4735209    -1.10   0.271    -1.449378    .4067897 
     married |   .8463326   .4568676     1.85   0.064    -.0491115    1.741777 
    children |  -.1193257   .1147238    -1.04   0.298    -.3441802    .1055289 
      hhhead |   .5981817   .4808451     1.24   0.213    -.3442573    1.540621 
       trend |  -.5994925   .3677569    -1.63   0.103    -1.320283    .1212978 
      cityT2 |  -.8047743   .5916912    -1.36   0.174    -1.964468    .3549191 
      cityT3 |   .2957965   .8515092     0.35   0.728    -1.373131    1.964724 
      cityT4 |  -1.239524   .7874104    -1.57   0.115     -2.78282     .303772 
      cityT5 |   .1266175   .7354171     0.17   0.863    -1.314773    1.568008 
      cityT6 |   .0225123   .7812385     0.03   0.977    -1.508687    1.553712 
       _cons |    1206.58   736.8451     1.64   0.102    -237.6102     2650.77 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
big          | 
        male |   1.843614   .4895411     3.77   0.000     .8841315    2.803097 
         age |   .2789818   .1728603     1.61   0.107    -.0598181    .6177817 
       agesq |  -.3447405   .2089946    -1.65   0.099    -.7543624    .0648814 
        educ |   .1091392    .226016     0.48   0.629    -.3338441    .5521224 
      educsq |   -.369972   1.420124    -0.26   0.794    -3.153365    2.413421 
   kdistprim |   .0032273    .102969     0.03   0.975    -.1985882    .2050429 
    kdistsec |  -.0066518    .046442    -0.14   0.886    -.0976765    .0843729 
     momeduc |   .0757266    .069709     1.09   0.277    -.0609006    .2123538 
     dadeduc |   .0538672   .0562091     0.96   0.338    -.0563007     .164035 
   momformal |   .4062419   .8379858     0.48   0.628     -1.23618    2.048664 
   dadformal |   -.177371   .4715687    -0.38   0.707    -1.101629    .7468866 
     married |  -.4113186   .4616361    -0.89   0.373    -1.316109    .4934716 
    children |  -.1268992    .117069    -1.08   0.278    -.3563502    .1025517 
      hhhead |   .2712471   .4870992     0.56   0.578    -.6834497    1.225944 
       trend |  -.5090753   .3745428    -1.36   0.174    -1.243166    .2250152 
      cityT2 |  -1.775578   .5707631    -3.11   0.002    -2.894254   -.6569033 
      cityT3 |  -.6563304   .8508499    -0.77   0.440    -2.323965    1.011305 
      cityT4 |  -2.211388   .8018383    -2.76   0.006    -3.782963   -.6398143 
      cityT5 |  -1.584811   .7891059    -2.01   0.045     -3.13143   -.0381916 
      cityT6 |  -.2896324    .749163    -0.39   0.699    -1.757965      1.1787 
       _cons |     1014.8   750.4387     1.35   0.176    -456.0332    2485.632 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
public       | 
        male |  -.5972426   .4558901    -1.31   0.190    -1.490771    .2962855 
         age |   .1335665   .1509389     0.88   0.376    -.1622683    .4294013 
       agesq |  -.0726103   .1766551    -0.41   0.681    -.4188478    .2736273 
        educ |   .2644814   .2066158     1.28   0.201    -.1404782     .669441 
      educsq |   .4552323   1.246232     0.37   0.715    -1.987338    2.897803 
   kdistprim |   .0576885   .0853955     0.68   0.499    -.1096837    .2250606 
    kdistsec |   .0695581   .0382476     1.82   0.069    -.0054058    .1445219 
     momeduc |    .004732    .065306     0.07   0.942    -.1232655    .1327295 
     dadeduc |   .0904871   .0505858     1.79   0.074    -.0086593    .1896334 
   momformal |   .2364915   .7534257     0.31   0.754    -1.240196    1.713179 
   dadformal |   .0764036   .4208799     0.18   0.856    -.7485059    .9013131 
     married |   1.022381   .4201959     2.43   0.015      .198812     1.84595 
    children |   -.181306   .0941846    -1.93   0.054    -.3659045    .0032924 
      hhhead |   .6919723   .4511107     1.53   0.125    -.1921885    1.576133 
       trend |  -.8652108    .337154    -2.57   0.010    -1.526021    -.204401 
      cityT2 |  -1.347306   .5542582    -2.43   0.015    -2.433632     -.26098 
      cityT3 |   .0168272   .7761988     0.02   0.983    -1.504495    1.538149 
      cityT4 |  -.9109426    .667258    -1.37   0.172    -2.218744    .3968589 
      cityT5 |   .0912407   .6804659     0.13   0.893    -1.242448    1.424929 
      cityT6 |   .1942339   .7439718     0.26   0.794    -1.263924    1.652392 
       _cons |   1727.336   675.5535     2.56   0.011     403.2758    3051.397 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(occup==none is the base outcome) 
 
 